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Ben S. Bernanke. The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013. 
 
The year 2014 might not seem significant, but for those who follow economics, and more 
specifically, the Federal Reserve, it is an important year for many reasons. First, the Federal Reserve 
was created by the Federal Reserve Act, signed by President Woodrow Wilson on December 23, 
1913. The details of the Federal Reserve System were hashed out, and the Federal Reserve Banks 
established in 1914. So, while 2013 marks the centennial of the Federal Reserve Act, for all 
practical purposes, 2014 marks the centennial of the Federal Reserve System. Second, 2014 marks 
a leadership transition -- Ben S. Bernanke’s term as chairman ended on January 31, and Janet 
Yellen became the first women to serve as chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors on 
February 3. Finally, the “tapering” (or slowing) of the economic stimulus pursued by the Federal 
Reserve as result of the deep recession and slow and painful economic recovery, has begun and will 
likely continue throughout the year. 
 
For these reasons, it is a perfect time to read, “The Federal Reserve and the Financial 
Crisis” by Ben S. Bernanke. It is an excellent book for social studies teachers -- providing an 
intersection of history, civics, and economics in a short, readable, volume by a brilliant economist 
and one of the most significant public servants of our time. Bernanke has been praised for his 
ability to communicate complex economic ideas to non-economists, and he justifies that praise 
with this book by demystifying the Fed for the reader. The book is based on a series of lectures he 
gave at George Washington University in March of 2012. The book was published in 2013. It is 
divided into two primary sections, 1) the history and development of the Federal Reserve as an 
institution, and 2) the Federal Reserve’s actions during the financial crisis. Of course Bernanke 
was not a passive observer, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve he led the institution during a 
crucial period and established the roadmap for the Fed’s management of the financial crisis.  
 
When discussing the creation of the Fed, Bernanke says the mission of the Federal Reserve 
is to “achieve macroeconomic stability” and to “maintain financial stability.” He comes back to 
these two objectives several times during the book. The first duty (macroeconomic stability) is the 
one that gets the media attention every six weeks as the FOMC meets to determine its monetary 
policy. The second (maintain financial stability) too often flies beneath the radar, but it was the 
reason the Fed was created -- “to either prevent or mitigate financial panics or financial crises.” At 
several points Bernanke describes the role of a central bank in maintaining financial stability by 
making the connection to Walter Bagehot’s dictum, which says that central banks should lend 
freely, to solvent firms, against good collateral, at penalty interest rates (to discourage banks from 
taking advantage of the policy).  
 
Bernanke is a self-described educator and proves to be an excellent communicator in this 
book as he explains complicated economic content in simple language. For example, Bernanke 
explains how bank panics occur and why they are dangerous without dragging his readers through 
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a money and banking lecture. Instead, he leads the reader to understanding through the story of 
George Bailey, Jimmy Stewart’s character from the classic movie “It’s a Wonderful Life”.  Bernanke 
explains that banks sometimes have liquidity problems because their assets are long-term (tied up 
as loans), but their liabilities are short-term (consumers can demand their deposits at any time). If 
confidence crumbles, and depositors run to the bank and demand their money, but bank assets 
are tied up in long-term loans, banks can find themselves with liquidity problems. This was Jimmy 
Stewart’s problem in the movie. Bernanke asks, “How could the Fed have helped Jimmy Stewart?” 
Stewart could have called the Fed and asked for a short term loan, using his loans as collateral 
(assuming the building and loan was solvent). He could use the money to pay depositors, and quell 
the run on his bank. This is the Federal Reserve, the nation’s central bank, acting as the “lender of 
last resort.” 
 
Bernanke devotes the first half of the book to providing historical context for the recent 
financial crisis and the Federal Reserve’s response. Prior to the Fed, Bernanke made his mark as a 
macroeconomist and economic historian. This is evident in his treatment of the Great Depression. 
He describes many factors which figured into the severity of the Great Depression, but freely 
acknowledges that the Fed’s failure to act was a primary reason the depression was so deep and 
lasted for so long. There is little doubt that this knowledge influenced Bernanke’s thinking during 
the dark days of the financial crisis of 2007 -2009. President Roosevelt, who is often painted as the 
person who saved the country from the Great Depression with his alphabet soup of programs, gets 
little discussion in Bernanke’s treatment of the period. He says the most important of Roosevelt’s 
actions were the creation of the FDIC and moving the country off the gold standard. In fact, 
Bernanke spends considerable time discussing the gold standard, which has gained much attention 
in recent years. He says that a gold standard does relatively well at maintaining low and stable 
inflation over long periods of time, but in shorter segments, fluctuations in the gold supply are  
likely to lead to volatile periods of inflation and deflation. As such, during the Great Depression, 
countries that abandoned the gold standard early recovered more quickly than those who 
remained on the gold standard. He finishes his historical survey by discussing the Fed’s experience 
during WWII, “the great inflation” of the 1970s and early 1980s, Paul Volcker’s painful (but much 
needed) medicine of high interest rates, and the Great Moderation -- a period when many felt that 
policymakers had figured out how to achieve low inflation and maximum employment for the long 
run. Bernanke credits his predecessors, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, with establishing the 
Fed’s credibility for maintaining price stability. He ends the section with a description of the 
origins of the financial crisis. 
 
Next, Bernanke tackles the financial crisis and emphasizes the Fed’s responsibility to 
“maintain financial stability” acting as the lender of last resort. He begins by describing some of 
the market vulnerabilities that existed prior to the financial crisis: exotic mortgages, poor lending 
practices, mortgage securitization, complex financial instruments (such as CDOs), and the role of 
rating agencies. Underlying the entire structure was the assumption by both borrowers and lenders 
of ever-rising housing prices. Of course, we know the story -- housing prices fell. These factors are 
well explained by Bernanke in plain language. He describes the financial crisis as a classic financial 
panic, which happened outside the traditional banking system. Bernanke refers back to the Great 
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Depression and reminds the reader that the role of the Fed during a financial crisis is to lend freely 
to halt runs and restore financial system functioning. So, Bernanke describes a Federal Reserve 
that acted for the purpose it was created -- to serve as lender of last resort. The difference is that the 
crisis was occurring outside the traditional banking sector, so the Fed under Bernanke’s leadership 
used innovative methods to facilitate lending beyond the traditional banking sector, where 
liquidity and stability were most needed. And, Bernanke is clear, stating several times, that loans 
were made to solvent institutions and the loans were fully collateralized. In the end, all of the loans 
were paid back in full with interest-- the Fed lost no money.  
 
Of course one of the more controversial moves was rescuing some firms (e.g. Bear Stearns 
and AIG), but allowing Lehman Brothers to fail. This has been much discussed by Monday 
morning quarterbacks who have been mulling the counterfactual ever since. First, Bernanke 
explains that Lehman Brothers was not a bank so it was not overseen by the Fed, but neither were 
Bear Stearns and AIG -- the Fed used section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act which allowed 
lending to non-traditional banking institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances". More 
importantly, Lehman was not solvent. As the nation’s central bank, the Fed gives collateralized 
loans to financial institutions that are solvent, but may lack liquidity. The Fed’s loan to AIG was a 
collateralized loan to a solvent company, whereas Lehman was insolvent. Lehman was allowed to 
fail.  Its failure shocked the financial system, particularly the money market, and quickly spread to 
the commercial paper market. The Fed acted to backstop these markets to minimize damage. At its 
root, says Bernanke, was the “too big to fail” problem -- these firms were so large that their failure 
posed a systemic economic risk, so government was obliged to rescue them. Bernanke says they 
should be allowed to fail, but in a way that it does not bring down the entire financial system (he 
addresses regulatory changes at the end of the book). 
 
As a result of the financial crisis, the economy fell into deep recession. The Fed addressed 
the aftermath of the crisis through the use of monetary policy. He makes clear distinctions between 
fiscal and monetary policy, something that social studies students often struggle with. In fact, 
research has shown that monetary policy is among the most difficult concepts for students to learn 
and for teachers to teach (Walstad and Rebeck, 2001). Bernanke’s treatment of monetary policy is 
clear, precise, and easy to understand. Of course, Fed policies to support the economy during the 
severe recession have been the topic of much criticism, but it is clear that Bernanke believes the 
Fed acted appropriately. Some common criticisms are that the Fed has been too aggressive in 
increasing the money supply, has used strange new monetary tools, and that inflation will be the 
inevitable result. Bernanke explains that after short-term rates had been reduced to essentially zero, 
the Fed used Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP), which the press has labeled quantitative easing 
(QE), to lower longer term rates. Bernanke writes that QE employs the same mechanism as normal 
open market operations, but has the Fed accomplish the task by purchasing different assets. 
Bernanke says this is normal monetary policy, focused on longer-term rates rather than the short-
term rates. So is the Fed “printing money” as is commonly heard in the press? The Fed has the 
unique ability to credit the accounts of the institutions from which it buys financial assets (U.S. 
Treasury Securities) -- essentially creating money out of thin air. When the Fed sells Treasuries, the 
money disappears, back into thin air. But, the Fed is not printing money in the sense that currency 
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is being produced -- Bernanke points out that the amount of currency in circulation has remained 
relatively flat. Instead, these asset purchases create deposits that exist as bank reserves. Banks can 
utilize reserves to make loans to businesses and individuals. As reserves increase, interest rates 
decrease, which makes purchasing cars, homes, and capital equipment more attractive to 
households and businesses. What about inflation fears? At the time the book was written, the Fed 
had increased the size of its balance sheet by $2 Trillion, and many were convinced that this would 
result in inflation. Bernanke points out that in recent years, inflation has not been the danger. 
Rather, there have been real fears of deflation. While the recession ended in June of 2009, the 
recovery has been slow and uneven; to many people it seems that the economy is still in recession. 
Bernanke ends the book by acknowledging the difficult economic period we have endured, and by 
expressing his confidence that the U.S. economy will recover its strength. 
 
As economists and historians think about the history of the Fed, they often see Paul 
Volcker’s time as Chairman as a key period -- his emphasis on the importance of Fed credibility 
and price stability (a low and stable rate of inflation) influenced the economics profession and the 
way the Fed has done business since that time. It might very well be the case that the Bernanke 
years become another defining time -- his innovative approach to providing liquidity and stability 
to financial institutions, and efforts to increase transparency and communication has enhanced 
modern economic theory and added a new dimension to an evolving institution. History will bear 
the burden of deciphering whether he was a visionary, or whether he missed the mark.  
 
In short, this is a readable, approachable book that is a “must read” for the social studies 
community. It tells the economic history of the past 100 years, but also helps the reader 
understand the financial crisis and the resulting recession. And, it lets the reader see into the mind 
of one of our nation’s brightest economists, and someone who (I believe) will be remembered as 
one of the most significant policymakers of our time.  
 
Social studies teachers will be pleased to know that the lecture materials (from which this 
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